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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,

:
:
:

vs.

:

Case No. 920823-CA

::

DAVID LAIRD HANSEN,
Defendant and Appellant.

Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The State makes several errors in its argument that the corpus
delicti

of the crime with which Mr. Hansen

is charged was

established prior to admitting Mr. Hansen's confession.
First is the State's contention that proof of identification
is not required to establish corpus delicti.
broad

generalization, which

the United

That is an overly

States

Supreme

Court

denounced in Smith v. United States of America, 348 U.S. 147 (Oct.
term 1954).

Under the Smith rule, crimes which require the

identity of the accused to be known in order for a crime to lie,
should receive a higher level of protection than the general corpus
delicti rule.
Second,

That rule applies here.
the state misunderstands the context of State v.

Johnson, 821 P. 2d 1150, 1162, wherein the court makes a general
statement that the state is not required to show independent
evidence "that the accused is the guilty agent." Johnson is a case
that deals with the issue of whether proof of a crime is necessary
to

allow

pre-crime

inculpatory

According to the Johnson court,
1

statements

to

be

admitted.

the issue of what evidence is

necessary to prove a crime has been committed is a seperate inquiry
under the corpus delicti rule.
Third, the State misunderstands the legal meaning of the word
"injury" in the corpus delicti rule, rendering their arguments
legally impotent.

The State erroneously substitutes a common

medical meaning for the word "injury" in place of the technical
legal meaning.

The State believes that the "injury" component of

the rule is satisfied by the head wound received by the accident
victim.

However, case law in this jurisdiction states that

evidence must be presented that the "injury specified in the crime"
occured. The injury specified in the crime charged is the illegal
leaving of an accident scene by a motor vehicle operator.
Finally, the State

improperly

accuses Mr. Hansen

of an

additional crime for the first time on appeal, the crime of
illegally crossing the median strip of 1-15.

Mr. Hansen was

neither charged nor tried for such a crime, and the trial court
judge did not consider it in his decision.

The State assumes the

role of judge and jury, and asks the Court of Appeals to affirm Mr.
Hansen's convictions on the basis of the purely

speculative

criminality embodied in a non-existent criminal charge.
Ii

is

prejudicial,

and

a

violation

of

Mr.

Hansen's

constitutional rights to a fair trial and the due process of law,
for the State to impute criminal guilt to Mr. Hansen without his
having been charged or tried.
Because of the egregious faults in the State's argument and
the

failure

of the

State to provide
2

independent, clear and

convincing proof that a crime was even committed, this conviction
should be reversed.
ARGUMENT
"the state concedes that the there [sic] must be a
showing by clear and convincing evidence, independent of
the Defendant's confession, that the person who left the
scene of the accident was the driver. That is because if
it was the driver who was mortally injured, and it was
the passenger who left the scene, there is no crime for
which the passenger could be convicted. And thus, the
criminal connection to the injury could not be
established." (Brief of Plaintiff-Appellee, p.10)

This admission by Mr. Davis, the Deputy Utah County Attorney,
is a concise and accurate restatement of the argument to which the
Defendant adheres.

The pivotal portion of the above statement is

that "there must be a showing by clear and convincing evidence,
independent of the Defendant's confession, that the person who left
the scene of the accident was the driver."
The "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard, mentioned
above, establishes the extent of the State's burden in proving that
a crime has been committed before a confession can be admitted at
trial. The reasoning used by the trial judge shows that the state
failed to meet that burden.
In denying the Defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court
judge stated that he recognized that the question of the operator
of the vehicle and the identity of the person committing the
offense must be answered the same in order to convict.
had

allowed

the

confession

for purposes

of

The judge

identifying

the

operator, reasoning that sufficient corroborating evidence had been
3

presented and that the confession is what "makes the difference."
(Trial Transcript at pg. 60)
However, the purpose of corroborative evidence is not merely
to set up the confession so that the confession can then "make the
difference." The Utah Supreme Court has rejected the argument that
"independent corroborative evidence of the corpus delicti need only
be consistent with

and tend

to

* confirm

and strengthen

the

confession.'" (citation omitted) State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,
1163 (Utah 1991).
In the case at bar, the judge was clearly following the
discredited theory that

"corroborative evidence of the corpus

delicti need only..*confirm and strengthen the confession.,n

As

mentioned in the preceding paragraph, State v. Johnson, 821 P. 2d at
1163, makes it the law in this state that such evidence does not
meet the clear and convincing standard. The State's own summary of
the evidence presented shows that it did not accomplish anything
more than to "confirm and strengthen" Mr. Hansen's confession, and
that the real basis of the corpus delici was the confession itself.
The State summarized the evidence that they presented at trial
as follows:
"The evidence indicates that the vehicle rolled once and came
to rest on the passenger side, that the injured person was
trapped underneath the passenger side and had received mortal
injuries to the head, that blood was found where the passenger
window of the vehicle came to rest, and that the other
occupant of the vehicle exited from the driver's window
shortly after the accident." (Trial Transcript at p. 10)
The Defendant stipulates to those facts, but asserts that
those

facts

can

only

serve

to
4

"confirm

and

strengthen

the

confession."

None

of

them

provide

independent,

clear

and

convincing evidence that a crime was committed, because none of
those facts clearly show the identity of the driver.
The State asserts that it is "not required to show independent
evidence

is the guilty agent./,f

'that the accused

[Brief of

Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 8; quoting State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150,
1162 (Utah 1991)]

In order for the State's argument to succeed,

that assertion must be true without exception.

However, it is the

position of the defendant that an exception exists in cases where
it

cannot

be

shown

that

identifying the accused.

a crime

has

been

committed

without

The exception was recognized and created

by the United States Supreme Court.
In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 154,
199,

99 L.ed. 192,

75 S. Ct. 194 (1954), the Court addressed the corpus delicti

rule in the context of a tax fraud case where the identity of the
taxpayer

was

an

element

of

the

cause

of

action.

The

Court

recognized that:
"as to this crime, it cannot be shown that the crime has
been committed without identifying the accused. Thus we
are faced with the choice of either applying the
corroboration rule to this offense and according the
accused even greater protection than the rule affords to
a defendant in a homicide prosecution, (string cite
omitted), or of finding the rule wholly inapplicable
because of the nature of the offense, stripping the
accused of this guarantee altogether. We choose to apply
the rule, with its broader guarantee, to crimes ....
where the corroborative evidence must implicate the
accused in order to show that a crime has been
committed." Smith, 99 L.ed. 192, 199.
The case at bar is a crime where the "corroborative evidence
must implicate the accused" as the operator of the vehicle or the
5

charges cannot stand. The only corroborating evidence presented at
trial, other than the confession, merely tended to put someone in
the car who was wearing clothes similar to clothes worn by Mr.
Hansen the next day.

[Trial Transcript at pp.S^/^S, 24^*2.^

No direct evidence indicated that the similarly dressed person
was the operator of the car.

From the evidence presented, it is

just as likely that the person was the passenger, and perhaps more
likely considering that the victim was the owner of the car, not
Mr. Hansen. [Trial Transcript at p.VO]
Even the Johnson rule, upon which the State bases its entire
argument, is not as straightforward as the State makes it appear in
its Brief.

The quoted sentence from Johnson, stating that it is

not necessary to show independently that the accused is the guilty
agent, is immediately proceeded by footnote #8, in which the court
distinguishes Johnson from cases where the issue is what quantum of
evidence is necessary to prove a crime has been committed.

The

court states:
"We note that some confusion has arisen surrounding
corpus delicti because the term has more than one use.
This case involves the question of when proof of the
crime is required to allow introduction of a defendant's
confession. In another context, corpus delicti refers to
evidence that the crime was committed."
[Johnson at
1162, footnote 8.]
Johnson was an appellate case that examined the issue of
whether statements against interest, made by the defendant before
the crime was committed, should have been afforded the protection
of the corpus delicti rule.

[Johnson at 1163-1164]

Therefore,

carte blanche reliance on Johnson would be misplaced in the context
6

of the case at bar, because the case at bar does not involve any
statements of Mr. Hansen made before the accident occurred.
Rather, the issue is whether the state provided enough independent
evidence that a crime was committed to allow the defendant's postarrest confession to be admitted, where the state must prove the
identity of the guilty agent to show that there was a crime.
Although the Smith rule should be dispositive in this case,
other portions of the State's argument are seriously flawed.

The

State incorrectly applies the facts of the case to both elements of
the corpus delicti rule.
The first element of the rule is that independent evidence
must show that a "wrong, an injury, or a damage" has been done.
[Johnson at 1162]

The State claims that the injury prong of the

rule is satisfied by "either the mortal injury received by the one
occupant of the vehicle, or the leaving of the mortally injured man
by the other occupant." [Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, p. 9]
The State confuses medical injury with legal injury.
However, State v. Knoefler, 563 P. 2d 175, 176 (Utah 1977),
quoted in Johnson at 1162, holds that the State must provide
independent evidence that the "injury specified in the crime
occurred, and that such injury was caused by someone's criminal
conduct." (emphasis added)

Mr. Hansen was not charged with

causing the injury or death of the other occupant of the vehicle,
and no citizen is under an affirmative duty to render aid to
persons in need of medical attention. The injury specified in the
crime charged was that a driver allegedly left the scene of an
7

injury accident without filing a report.

In order to prove that

such a crime occurred, the State must show which occupant of the
car was the driver, something they have consistently failed to do.
Not only does the State's argument fail to establish the first
prong of the corpus delicti rule, the second prong is equally
unfulfilled by the reasoning of the State. The State knows that if
they cannot independently prove that Mr. Hansen was the driver of
the vehicle, then they cannot prove that the "injury" was caused by
someone's criminal conduct.

Accordingly, the State has attempted

to manufacture a very dubious "criminal conduct" which they hope to
attribute to Mr. Hansen without having to adhere to the rule that
the scope of review on appeal is limited to the record created by
the court below.
The State claims that because the vehicle rolled across the
median, Mr. Hansen is guilty of criminally "operating" a vehicle
"over, across or within" a the median of a divided highway, as
prohibited by Utah Code Annotated, § 46-6-63.10(2). This reasoning
again shows the lack of understanding which the State has in
regards to the corpus delicti rule.

Even if Mr. Hansen stood

convicted of this crime, it would not provide corpus delicti for
any other crimes charged at trial.
validity

of

the

State's

But first we must examine the

self-serving

prognostication

that

conviction for such a crime would be inevitable.
In the first place, a vehicle that is out of control is not
being "operated" by the driver.
requires a criminal mens rea.

Second, commission of a crime

The fact that the incident was an
8

automobile "accident" necessarily

eliminates the possibility of

criminal intent in crossing the median —

it was not intentional,

it was accidental. Third, the State has not shown that it was Mr.
Hansen that operated the vehicle in the median — so once again, no
criminal conduct can be imputed to him. Finally, the Defendant has
not been able to find any case law where a driver in a roll-over
accident was charged with illegally operating a vehicle in the
median of a divided highway.
Even if the State could prove that Mr. Hansen is guilty of
crossing the median, the corpus delicti has not been established
for

any

other

crime

which

arises

out

of

the

same

factual

circumstances. Utah case law does not address this specific issue,
but case law from other jurisdictions mandates independent evidence
for each crime charged.

In a 1986 murder-rape case, the Illinois

Court of Appeals ruled that "independent evidence of one offense
does not allow use of a defendant's confession for all crimes for
which the defendant is charged."

People v. Kokoraleis, 501 NE 2d

207, 227 (111. App. 1986).
Finally, the defendant strongly protests the illegitimate
attempt of the State to impute guilt to Mr. Hansen for a criminal
charge which was never even mentioned at the trial level.

Mr.

Hansen was not charged with operating a vehicle in the median, was
not tried, did not have a chance to defend himself, had no notice
that the State would accuse him on appeal, and cannot properly
prepare an appeal based on non-existent criminal charges and
suppositional reasoning as to what the trial court judge would have
9

done

had

he

accusation.

had

the

chance

to

consider

this

entirely

new

The appeal must be based on the record below, not

imaginary convictions.
It is unthinkable that the State could be allowed to bring
additional criminal charges for the first time on appeal.

To

actually base a substantial portion of the State's argument on an
opaquely related crime that "very well could have been charged,"
but was not, shows the flawed character of the State's theory and
analysis.

If convictions could be affirmed by raising criminal

charges for the first time on appeal, and skipping the trial
process

altogether, the

financial

cost

to

the

public

would

certainly be lowered, but the price we all would pay in lost
constitutional freedoms would be unbearable.
As a matter of public policy, there are two reasons that the
convictions of Mr. Hansen should be overturned.

First, if the

State is allowed to secure a conviction without independently
identifying Mr. Hansen as the driver, the corpus delicti rule will
be diluted, "stripping the accused of this guarantee altogether."
If it cannot be shown that a crime has been committed without
identifying the accused, the State must not be allowed to convict
citizens primarily on the basis of a confession.

The corpus

delicti rule was established to make sure that people are not
convicted on the strength of false confessions.
Second, the Court should send a signal to County Attorneys
that result oriented procedures will not be tolerated.
secondary

reasons

for

the

corpus
10

delicti

rule

is

One of the
to

force

prosecutors to do thorough investigations and call the witnesses
necessary to establish that a crime was committed. This is doubly
important in factual scenarios where the state must identify the
accused in order to show that a crime was committed.

If the State

is allowed to prosecute and convict anybody that comes forward and
confesses to a crime under such factual circumstances, then no
corpus delicti protection exists for those people.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Defendant respectfully requests
that the Trial Court's conviction be reversed in this matter.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this / 7

day of May, 1993.

Cleve J. £a£ch
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant

11

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed 2 true and correct copies of
the foregoing Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant to Benjamin T.
Davis, Deputy Utah County Attorney, 100 East Center, Suite 2100,
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/ 7 day of May, 1993.
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